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WORKING TOWARD WORLD PEACE IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT: IN A WORLD OF UNCERTAINTY, TERRORISM, AND 
DISAGREEMENTS, IS IT POSSIBLE? 
 
Victoria Carlton* 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the end of World War II (WWII), the idea and concept of war 
has changed, technology has advanced, and disseminating information is 
instantaneous. The world is different. The Westphalian international 
system (up until WWII) divided and created the nation states that make 
up, for the most part, the geographical boundaries of the world as it is 
today. In the Westphalian international system, nation states “were 
hermetically isolated from each other and were the only international 
legal persons,”1 and “considered as the only meaningful actor[s] within 
world affairs,” especially when considering territory, wars, and the 
governance of people. 2  After WWII, even though most of the 
geographical lines remained, the world began to dramatically change and 
move into a post-Westphalian international system (1945–present). In a 
post-Westphalian international system, there is recognition of “a 
spectrum of actors – individuals, NGOs, corporations, cities, regions, 
states, and international organizations.” 3  In the post-Westphalian 
international system, non-state actors4 became more prevalent, featuring 
a spectrum of actors that includes terrorists, cartels, mercenaries, and 
organized opposition groups within nation states.5 The recognition of 
non-state actors on the international stage has expanded international law 
and interactions of state actors with small organizations. 
In this post-Westphalian international system, the increase in 
globalization6 has created social and technological changes that are re-																																								 																					
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2016, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Utah.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Eric Talbot Jensen for his supervision and help on this article. 
1 ERIC ENGLE, IDEAS IN CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 1 
(2013) (noting that the Westphalian international system spanned from 1685–1945). 
2 See Farida Lakhany, How Important are Non-State Actors, 59 PAK. HORIZON, 37 (2006). 
3 ENGLE, supra note 1, at 1. 
4 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 711, 715–16 (2008) (“[N]on-state 
actor is applied to non-governmental groups who directly or indirectly engage in support of non-
governmental combatants in non-international and purely conflicts. These groups take a variety of 
forms, including: (1) Regularly constituted groups . . . ; (2) Non-regularly constituted groups of 
combatants . . . ; (3) Spontaneously gathered groups who engage in combat or who engage in 
sporadic acts of collective violence . . . ; (4) Mercenaries acting as an autonomous group or as part of 
other groups of combatants; and (5) Expatriate volunteers who engage for a period of time in combat 
or in support of combat operations, either as separate units or as part of duly constituted or ad hoc 
units.”).  
5 Id. 
6 David Held et al., Globalization, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 1, 483 (1999) [hereinafter Held] 
(“Globalization: n. a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows 
and networks of activity, interaction, and power.”); Alan Tidwell & Charles Lerche, Globalization 
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defining the world, and today there are “political transformation[s], 
which could be as important as the creation of the nation-state; the 
exclusive link between geography and political power has now been 
broken.”7 The changing and developing world after WWII was faced 
with a responsibility to form an international system of laws that would 
bind nations, non-state actors, and individuals during times of peace and 
conflict. The purpose was to create an international system to build 
relationships and peaceful conflict resolution capacity to avoid another 
devastating world war. The United States and the world, as a whole 
community, should be working towards a world where non-international 
armed conflicts are managed and controlled effectively. 
This Comment explores the options for the international community 
to reform the current approach to ending non-state actors and ways to 
proactively stop future non-international armed conflicts from arising. To 
resolve non-international armed conflicts, it is necessary to address the 
grievances within reason, and establish international cooperation in the 
prevention and punishment of non-state actors. Additionally, resolving 
current non-international armed conflicts is to work towards solving 
future threats and becoming proactive in educating, alleviating poverty, 
and changing the mindset of foreign affairs.  
Part I of this Comment introduces the meaning of non-international 
armed conflict and the insufficiencies in the law of armed conflict. Part II 
addresses why the coercive approach of employing arms is not working 
to end non-international armed conflicts. Part III examines two 
successful approaches for what is working to end non-international 
armed conflicts and how we can continue these approaches in current 
conflicts and those that may arise in the future. Lastly, Part IV advocates 
for a strategy of peace that suggests a more theoretical approach for 
proactively ending future non-international armed conflicts. 
 
A. The Creation of an International Governing Organization:  
The United Nations 
 
At the time of WWII, the division between nations who supported 
the “Allies”8 against those who opposed the “Axis”9 powers illuminated 
the lack of regulation in war and the need for change. Just months before 
World War II ended, on April 25, 1945, in San Francisco, California, “46 
nations met to discuss the creation of the United Nations, an international 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																
and Conflict Resolution, 9 INT’L J. OF PEACE STUD. 47, 47 (2004) (Additionally, “[g]lobalization, 
understood broadly, is an accelerator of social change.”). 
7 Held, supra note 6, at 487. 
8 The Allies consisted of the United States of America, Britain, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Russia), Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. 
9 The Axis powers were Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. 
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organization intended to maintain peace between nations.” 10  A few 
weeks later, at the conclusion of this conference, on June 26, there was 
unanimous approval for the charter that created the UN, coinciding with 
the end of the war on the European front.11  
The UN Charter gives clear direction for member states:12 “We the 
peoples of the United Nations [are] determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind.”13  
The creation of the UN developed a working organization that had a 
mission statement for peace and for regulating the use of force. “The 
general situation prevailing was paradoxical: with the creation of the 
United Nations and the codification of human rights, greater efforts than 
ever were being made to establish a new world order.”14 The worldwide 
feeling of tragedy from the events of WWII influenced a need and desire 
for peace. The creation of the UN was a way for member states to 
internationally unite with other states to prevent future war and crimes. 
Additionally, the creation of the UN established a regulatory body to 
create, amend, and enforce international laws. 
 
B. Post-WWII and the Geneva Conventions 
 
The post-WWII world was motivated to make changes to the current 
Laws of Armed Conflict since “[t]here were a number of weaknesses in 
the pre-WWII treaties. They only protected the forces of states who were 
party to the treaties, and the fact that the treaties were not universally 
adopted meant there were significant gaps in coverage during World War 
II.”15 In the aftermath of WWII, the doubts about the treaties’ capacity to 
successfully enforce international laws evaporated with the success of 
the war crimes’ tribunals against the Axis powers. Eventually, four new 
conventions were proposed in Geneva, Switzerland. 16  The Geneva 
Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols are what make up the 																																								 																					
10 The Learning Network, April 25, 1945 Conference to Form U.N. Meets as Allied Forces 
Near Victory Over Nazis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2012, 4:07 AM), 
http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/april-25-1945-conference-to-form-un-meets-as-allied-
forces-near-victory-over-nazis/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
11 Id. 
12 From 1946 to the current day there are 193 Member States of the United Nations. See 
Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2014). 
13 U.N. Charter Preamble.  
14 Resource Centre, The ICRC since 1945: the Geneva Conventions of 1949, INT’L COMMITTEE 
OF THE RED CROSS (Mar. 5, 2005), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-
genevaconventions-revision-1949.htm. 
15 GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 44 
(2012). 
16 Id. (quoting those conventions were: “(1) Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GWS); (2) Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea (GWS Sea); (3) Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW); and (4) 
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GCC)”) available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/. 
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Law of Armed Conflict (also referred to as International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL)). 
Two distinguished types of IHL emerged as it was developed. The 
first type of IHL is International Armed Conflict. International Armed 
Conflict is defined in Article 2 of the Geneva Convention as applying to 
“all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them.”17 The second type of IHL is Non-
International Armed Conflict, defined in Article 1 of Additional Protocol 
2 as “tak[ing] place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between 
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups.”18 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an 
organization that helps others understand armed conflict, explains the 
two distinguished types of IHL in simpler and clearer terms: 
 
International armed conflicts exist whenever there is 
resort to armed force between two or more States. Non-
international armed conflicts are protracted armed 
confrontations occurring between governmental armed 
forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or 
between such groups arising on the territory of a State 
[party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed 
confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity 
and the parties involved in the conflict must show a 
minimum of organisation.19 
 
Additionally, Kathleen Lawland 20  further clarifies what a non-
international armed conflict is: 
 
A non-international (or "internal") armed conflict refers 
to a situation of violence involving protracted armed 
confrontations between government forces and one or 
more organized armed groups, or between such groups 
themselves, arising on the territory of a State. In contrast 
to an international armed conflict, which opposes the 
armed forces of States, in a non-international armed 
																																								 																					
17 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/365-
570005?OpenDocument. 
18 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977 [hereinafter 
Protocol II], available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/475-760004?OpenDocument. 
19 ICRC, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW? at 5, Int’l Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper (2008) (emphasis added). 
20 Former head of the ICRC. 
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conflict at least one of the two opposing sides is a non-
State armed group.21   
 
International armed conflicts continue to occur. However, since 
WWII, there is recognition of 1) an increase in non-international armed 
conflicts; 2) an increase in non-state actor groups; and 3) an increase in 
non-state actor groups’ involvement in armed conflicts. Since the 
September 11 attacks on the United States,22 the increased involvement 
of non-state actors subsequently increased awareness of these changes 
and highlighted the complexity of stopping and preventing non-
international armed conflicts.  
International armed conflicts with non-state actors are less 
predictable than armed conflicts between state actors, because there are 
more ways to identify and contact state-actors as well as leverage state-
actors to end armed conflict. Complex difficulties arise when working 
towards peaceful ends in armed conflict with a non-state actor, including 
identifying the non-state actor, getting to a point of negotiations, and 
discovering the non-state actor’s interests and leverage points; thus, it is 
harder to achieve peaceful talks or obtain leverage in negotiations.  
The likelihood of peace talks with terrorist organizations that engage 
in armed conflict is much more difficult, and getting to a point of 
negotiations where leaders of terrorist groups come together to discuss 
different outcomes is nearly impossible in the modern age of 
transnational terrorist organizations. The world has changed and armed 
conflict is an ever-changing mechanism that “is not stagnant,”23 but 
instead continues to change as new types of armed conflicts arise.24  
The attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are a prime 
example of the unpredictability of a non-state actor. Although Al Qaeda 
was a known terrorist organization, the attack on the World Trade Center 
was a devastating and surprising event.25 The United States based its 
response to capture, imprison, and charge individuals on international 
law on Article 147 of Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 																																								 																					
21 Interview with Kathleen Lawand, Former Head of the ICRC, Int’l Committee of the Red 
Cross, in Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 12, 2012) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-international-armed-
conflict.htm; see also Protocol II (A non-international armed conflict “take[s] place in the territory 
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol.”). 
22 Referred throughout this Comment as “United States, ” rather than “U.S.” 
23 CORN et al., supra note 15, at 518. 
24 Id. (“Not surprisingly, the law does not always fit the new circumstance with precision, and 
at times it may seem like the square peg of an old law is being shoved into the round hole of a new 
problem. Among the emerging and developing LOAC [(Law of Armed Conflict)] issues, the 
question that has most vexed the United States in the past decade is how the LOAC applies to the 
fight against international terrorism.”). This need for change in the law of armed conflict is very 
specific to international terrorism because it is so prominent, but it is also very applicable to all 
future non-state actors who become involved in armed conflicts. 
25 Id. at 519. 
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Civilian Persons in Time of War, and the United States passed new 
domestic laws in response to the attack, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2441 – War 
Crimes and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (also referred to 
as AUMF).26 Here, international law only defines what grave breaches 
are considered under IHL, but the majority of reliance is based on the 
domestic laws passed by the United States. 
Thus, the current international laws of armed conflict and the 
domestic laws of nation states to prevent non-international armed 
conflicts are insufficient, and “[t]here is a substantial lack of clarity in 
the legal norms that convey obligations to those who are to abide by the 
law, particularly with respect to the legal status of combatants in 
conflicts of a non-international character and those engaged in purely 
domestic conflicts.”27  
 
II. ENDING NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT:  
WHAT IS NOT WORKING 
 
Establishing a point of peace seems out of reach, considering that the 
international community has no control over the actions of non-state 
actors. This is a valid concern, but in order to solve the problem of non-
international armed conflict, states need to modify their self-defense 
tactics after receiving attack.28 Changing the way the United States and 
other states react to non-state actors’ attacks can lead to movement and 
progression towards peaceful solutions and outcomes. Reacting swiftly 
and violently is effective up to a certain point, but long-lasting solutions 
require changes to the self-defense measures, approaches, and ways of 
thinking of a state in response to attacks.  
In the case of September 11, for example, the United States reacted 
quickly as information came in. In fact, on September 11, just fifteen 
minutes after the attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States 
intercepted a conversation of a known Al Qaeda member referring to the 
attacks, and by 2:40 p.m. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
believed he had enough intelligence to find those involved.29 However, 
the information seems to show that Rumsfeld, and others ignored 
contrary intelligence and sought some sort of entity to blame, i.e. notes 
from a meeting that occurred the day of the attacks, which read: “Now, 
nearly one year later, there is still very little evidence Iraq was involved 
in the Sept. 11 attacks. The conflicting information did not matter to 
Rumsfeld. ‘Go massive,’ the notes quote him as saying. ‘Sweep it all up. 																																								 																					
26 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224, 224–25 (2001). 
27 Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 794 (“Combatants covered by Common Article 3 are not given 
POW status. They are subject to national law and can therefore be charged and punished as common 
criminals. Protocol II encourages giving such combatants amnesty except for war crimes.”). 
28 115 Stat. at 224–25. An example of self-defense tactics was the immediate response of the 
United States after September 11 to enact the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
29 Joel Roberts, Plans For Iraq Attack Began On 9/11, CBS NEWS (Sept. 4, 2002, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/plans-for-iraq-attack-began-on-9-11/. 
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Things related and not.’”30 Even though there was strong information 
that linked Al Qaeda to the attacks, there was still a strike being prepared 
for Iraq.31 The United States reacted irrationally, from both a lack of 
information and a willingness to ignore the contrary intelligence it did 
have. 
The United States reacted with a war on terrorism. At the time, its 
reaction seemed justified, reasonable, and likely to stop further attacks. 
To some extent, it worked. Al-Qaeda today is significantly weakened and 
the Taliban is no longer the governing body of Afghanistan. However, 
even with those achievements, ten years after the attacks on the United 
States, the war on terror continues with no definite end date. Al Qaeda is 
still committing acts of terror, and other terrorist organizations like the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),32 are rising up around the world. 
War and retribution cannot bring about peace. Identifying failed 
approaches of the past can help states, as an international community, 
work towards better sustainable solutions that can invoke a peaceful 
ending in many non-international armed conflicts. 
 
A. The Coercive Approach (Carrying a Big Stick) 
 
Teddy Roosevelt’s Big Stick philosophy, “Speak softly and carry a 
big stick,”33 later extended to foreign affairs; this initially implied that 
the United States should have strong diplomacy backed by a strong navy, 
but today the ideology could be extended to any branch of the military.34 
The term is a double-edged sword, because although the philosophy 
allows mammoth military organizations to protect a nation like the 
United States, it also uses the fear of being attacked or other coercive 
behaviors to encourage diplomacy and honest working relationships with 
other states. This approach has a strong likelihood of creating inauthentic 
and shallow relationships with these states.  
The “coercive approach works with using negative sanctions, mostly 
by employing military and police enforcement.” 35  However, using 
negative sanctions is less likely to work and more likely to encourage 
further conflict. Negative sanctions include:  
 
[Being] severely punished either by killing them or 
putting them in prison, possibly after torturing them. 																																								 																					
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32  CNN Library, ISIS Fast Facts, CNN (November 17, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2014). ISIS was a 
creation from Al Qaeda, when leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri in 2006 “announce[d] the creation of 
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), and establishe[d] Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as its leader.” Id. 
33 Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Zeal: Teddy Roosevelt's Life and Writing, 10 LEGAL COMM. & 
RHETORIC: JALWD 125, 147 (2013). 
34 Id. at 196. 
35 BRUNO S. FREY, DEALING WITH TERRORISM: STICK OR CARROT? 27 (2004) (emphasis 
added). 
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This response is based on immediate and strong 
retribution and addresses the most urgent problems 
created by a terrorist [or other type of non-state actor] 
attack. Th[is type of] response is ‘re-active’ in so far as it 
is incident-related.36  
 
The coercive approach is a method used to deter an adversary from 
acting in a certain way or to manipulate their cost-benefit analysis to 
generate a desired result.37  
This Comment will discuss three distinct examples of coercive 
approaches in different conflicts and how this course of reaction failed. 
The first example is the immediate reaction of the United States after 
September 11 to open Guantanamo Bay, and to use coercive tactics on 
alleged Al Qaeda members believed to be involved in carrying out the 
September 11 attacks. The second example is the conflict between the 
Ireland Republican Army (IRA) terrorist organization and the United 
Kingdom over the dispute in Northern Ireland and its desire for 
independence. Lastly, the third example is the Russo-Chechen conflict 
over Chechnya’s desire for independence from Russia, and the 
development of a terrorist organization in response to Russia’s use of 
force to regain strength in Chechnya. In each of these situations, the 
conflict between the state and non-state actors only worsened in response 
to the coercive tactics used. 
 
1. Ending Terrorism One Prisoner at a Time: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
 
The United States has used coercive techniques in its approach with 
Guantanamo prisoners since the period after President Bush’s declaration 
of the war on terror.38 This approach somewhat continues to be the 
United States’ approach to the war on terror. In the aftermath of 
September 11, President Bush, with advice from his administration’s 
lawyers,39 opened Guantanamo Bay and sent detainees to the prison 
where allegedly the “worst of the worst”40 detainees were being kept. 
The coercive tactics used at Guantanamo Bay, whether by detaining 																																								 																					
36 Id. 
37 Liraz Margalit, Coercive Approach and Decision Making Models, 1 (2011) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974141. 
38 President George W. Bush, Address to the United States of America (Sept. 11, 2001) 
(transcript available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushaddress_ 
091101.htm) (“America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in 
the world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.”) (emphasis added). 
39 See Memorandum for the President, from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General (Jan. 25, 
2002) available at http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-the-law/application-geneva-convention-
prisoners-war-conflict-al-qaeda-taliban/p11893; see also Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 1, 2002) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf (describing torture and what 
constitutes extreme acts, sever pain, and mental anguish). 
40 Associated Press, Cheney: Gitmo holds the ‘worst of the worst’, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2009), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31052241/ns/world_news-terrorism/t/cheney-gitmo-holds-worst-worst/. 
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alleged terrorists or by using torture tactics to gain secret information, 
did not end the armed conflict or solve the core issues behind the terrorist 
attacks. The war on terror continues twelve years after its initiation; Al 
Qaeda is still functioning, not at the same capacity as before the war, but 
at a capacity where it is still a serious threat in some areas of the world.41 
Swift, coercive tactics did not effectively create a peaceful ending to the 
war on terror. 
After September 11, the United States rapidly reacted to capture Al 
Qaeda and Taliban affiliates to the point where some of those captured 
were not even linked with either organization. A report about 
Guantanamo detainees gathered from government-released documents 
found that:  
 
Fifty-five percent (55%) of the detainees are not 
determined to have committed any hostile acts against 
the United States or its coalition allies. Only 8% of the 
detainees were characterized as al Qaeda fighters. Of the 
remaining detainees, 40% have no definitive connection 
with al Qaeda at all and 18% have no definitive 
affiliation with either al Qaeda or the Taliban. The 
Government has detained numerous persons based on 
mere affiliations with a large number of groups that in 
fact, are not on the Department of Homeland Security 
terrorist watch list. Moreover, the nexus between such a 
detainee and such organizations varies considerably.42 
 
This type of reactive, coercive approach leads to inaccuracy, like the 
situation of the detainees who were not connected to or part of the 
planning of the September 11 attacks, and has not been a consistent, 
successful tactic to end non-international armed conflicts. The domestic 
laws like the AUMF have been insufficient to create transparency and 
support between the states where these individuals are citizens. 
Strengthening the relationship between the home states of these detainees 
would change the dynamic, and could eventually lead to the United 
States shutting down Guantanamo. Without that, communication and 
cooperation between the United States and home states for releasing 
these detainees is going to continue to be very difficult and dangerous. 
 
																																								 																					
41 See Abdulrahman al-Masri, Michele Chabin, Mona Alami, & Sarah Lynch, Al-Qaeda hasn't 
gone away, and is gaining, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/07/al-qaeda-spread/4358845/. 
42  MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA, 2–3 (2006).  
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2. Early, Violent Beginnings Between the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland 
 
Ireland, or parts of Ireland, has been in conflict with the United 
Kingdom since the late 1600s.43 From 1919 to 1922, the Irish War of 
Independence and partition of Ireland occurred.44 The partition of Ireland 
transpired after negotiations came down to England’s ultimatum to 
Ireland, to either sign an agreement or face war with England in three 
days.45 After the negotiations, the parties signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
providing that England recognize the independence of twenty-six 
southern counties.46 In return, England kept the six northern counties.  
Shortly thereafter, rising tensions in Northern Ireland continued, due 
to the inequalities and discrimination against Catholics in “electoral 
rights, housing, and employment.”47 The violence and unhappiness with 
the state of the nation and the lack of human rights only escalated from 
there, with civil rights protests continuing up until the notorious Bloody 
Sunday of 1972.48 During Bloody Sunday, the police arrested 2,000 
people without trial, and seventeen people died while protesting the 
arrests. Subsequently, in a civil rights march to oppose the arrest, thirteen 
men died from being shot and fourteen others were injured.49 Overall, it 
is estimated that “[b]etween 1969 and 1999, almost 3,500 people died as 
a result of political violence in Northern Ireland.” 50  The conflict 
continued as members of the IRA began to bomb different locations in 
England. The conflict resulted in the United Kingdom enacting the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act,51 which allowed for individuals who were 
suspected of terrorist actions to be detained for forty-eight hours without 
being charged with the possibility of an extension of up to five days if 
done so by the Secretary of State.52 
For instance, the Guildford Four53 and Maguire Seven54 were taken 
into custody, without being formally charged per the new Prevention of 
																																								 																					
43  Northern Ireland Conflict, HISTORY, http://www.history.co.uk/shows/soldiers-
stories/articles/northern-ireland-conflict (last visited Nov. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Troubles]. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Kristin Archick, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RS21333, 1, 
1 (2014). 
48 Troubles, supra note 43. 
49 Id. 
50 Archick, supra note 47, at 1.  
51 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56 (U.K.) (stating, “An Act to 
proscribe organisations concerned in terrorism, and to give power to exclude certain persons from 
Great Britain or the United Kingdom in order to prevent acts of terrorism, and for connected 
purposes.”).  
52 Id. at pt. III(7)(2). 
53 The Guildford Four included: Gerard Conlon, Paul Michael Hill, Patrick Armstrong, and 
Carole Richardson. 
54 The McGuire Seven included: Anne Maguire, Patrick Maguire (father), Patrick Maguire (son 
and just fourteen years old), Vincent Maguire, Sean Smyth, Patrick O’Neill, Patrick “Giuseppe” 
Conlon. 
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Terrorism Act.55 The Guildford Four were accused of carrying out IRA 
bombings 56  in England, and the Maguire Seven were accused of 
possessing chemicals involved in making bombs for possible IRA 
attacks. Eventually, they were all convicted and sent to prison for these 
alleged crimes, later to be released and pardoned after being found 
innocent.57 In particular, the Guildford Four confessions were obtained 
by using coercive techniques, such as physical and mental torture.58 The 
accusations caused protests and conflict, and further deteriorated 
relations between the IRA and the United Kingdom. The United 
Kingdom’s reaction to the IRA attacks caused it to mishandle the 
interrogations and prosecution.59  Through coercive tactics that were 
unsuccessful and inaccurate, the United Kingdom amplified anger and 
rioting in Northern Ireland. 
In the early beginnings of the conflict between the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, the non-state actors (IRA) acted in deadly and unpredictable 
ways. The IRA’s dangerous attacks continued for decades before giving 
way to a peaceful solution. The IRA’s use of violence and the response 
by the United Kingdom helped make both sides aware that something 
needed to change. Additionally, the conflict created international 
awareness and concern. Negotiations and the eventual signing of a peace 
agreement ended Northern Ireland’s conflict, and will be discussed 
further in Part III. 
 
3. Russo-Chechen War: Involvement of Non-state Actors in an Armed 
Conflict 
 
At the end of the Cold War and the disbanding of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, “fifteen constituent union 
republics were proclaimed sovereign, independent states, and recognized 
by the international community bestowing upon them an acceptance, 
status, and legitimacy barely dreamt of even three years earlier.”60 
Chechnya did not receive any type of explicit independence at the end of 
this dissolution, but Chechnya formally announced its independence 
from Russia and furthermore stated that it was never willingly a part of 
Russia.61 Even though Chechnya declared independence from Russia, the 																																								 																					
55 The Guildford Four and Maguire Seven were among the first detained and held without 
charge under the new Act. 
56 Guildford Four are cleared, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/guildford-
four-are-cleared (last visited Nov. 29, 2014). These attacks occurred “[o]n October 5, 1974, an IRA 
bomb killed four people in a Guildford pub frequented by British military personnel, while another 
bomb in Woolwich killed three. British investigators rushed to find.”  
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 Gail W. Lapidus, Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya, 23 INT’L SECURITY, 5, 5 
(1998). 
61 See Saeed Ahmed, How Chechen rebels threaten Russian stability, CNN (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/03/29/chechnya.explainer/. 
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lack of declaration for this independence from Russia caused major 
conflict. Russia intentionally did not grant Chechnya independence, since 
Chechnya was and still is far too valuable to Russia. The rich amount of 
oil in the Caucasus region leaves an interest too strong for Russia to 
relinquish its control over Chechnya. 
After this declaration in November 1991, Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin sent troops to Chechnya; however, President Dzhokhar Dudayev, 
the first President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 62 and a former 
Soviet Air Force General, placed a blockade on Chechnya’s troops at the 
airport, forcing Yeltsin to eventually pull out. 63  President Dudayev 
continued to speak out against Russia, and in 1964, “Moscow-backed 
rebels attack[ed] Grozny with tanks and artillery. Rebels pull[ed] back 
the next day after street fighting [with Chechnya forces] and Dudayev 
claim[ed] victory.” 64  President Yeltsin then issued this warning: 
“Chechnya is a republic within the Russian Federation . . . . We have no 
moral right to stand aside and watch this bloodshed. The situation poses 
an extreme danger to stability and peace in our society.” 65  Soon 
thereafter, Russian forces entered the conflict. A bloody and violent war 
ensued, and by 1997 Russia and Chechnya conceded to peace treaty 
discussions.  
The peace discussions seemed successful at the time, but the treaty 
signed by both sides did not address the grievances of Chechnya. 
Chechnya desired full autonomy, and independence was still just that, a 
desire. 
 
Russia formally maintain[ed] that Chechnya is and must 
remain part of the Russian federation; Chechnya says it 
is already fully independent. The [peace] agreement, 
which stipulated that a decision on Chechnya's status 
should be deferred for five years, did not resolve that 
critical issue, and today's documents also deliberately 
skirted any definition of its sovereignty.66 
 
																																								 																					
62  Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/369 (last updated Feb. 19, 
2014) (“The Chechen Republic of Icherikia was the secessionist and internationally unrecognized 
government of Chechnya. It was formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.”). 
63 Lee Hockstader, Russia Pours Troops Into Breakaway Region, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 1994), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/stories/chechnya121294.htm. 
64 Id. (explaining the phrase “Moscow-backed rebels” was coined because it was believed that 
“Moscow adopted a thinly veiled policy of helping armed Chechen insurgents seeking to topple 
Dudayev.”). 
65 Michael Specter, Yeltsin Threatens Action on Warring Secessionist Area, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/30/world/yeltsin-threatens-action-on-warring-
secessionist-area.html. 
66 Alessandra Stanley, Yeltsin Signs Peace Treaty With Chechnya, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/13/world/yeltsin-signs-peace-treaty-with-chechnya.html 
(emphasis added). 
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The Russian approach was a paradigmatic coercive approach to ending 
the rebels uprising; immediately after Chechnya declared independence, 
Russia retaliated with force against those declarations. Russia’s focus 
was not on making amends, but to secure its interest over Chechnya’s 
natural resources. At all costs, Russia needed to prevent Chechnya 
gaining independence and Russia losing control over the natural 
resources in Chechnya from occurring.  
The peace did not last long. “In its initial stages, the Republic of 
Ichkeria focused on the independence of Chechnya from the Russian 
Federation.”67 In 1999, Chechen rebels and Russian troops at the border 
between Daegstan and Chechnya ran into more conflicts.68 Soon after, a 
bomb exploded near military apartments in Daegstan, and Vladimir 
Putin, the new Russian president at the time, deployed forces back into 
Chechnya because he believed that Chechen rebels were to blame for 
these explosions.69 Putin used coercive tactics against Chechen rebels 
and suspected terrorists to deplete the armed forces as efficiently as 
possible. Although complete war is no longer transpiring in Chechnya, 
hostility against Russia still persists.  
From 2004 to 2007, the former separatist government (Republic of 
Ichkeria) became associated with terrorist organizations across the 
Northern region of Chechnya. Later, President Doku Umarov, the last 
President of the Republic of Ichkeria, dismantled70 the Republic and 
created the Caucasus Emirate. 71  The Caucasus Emirate is a violent 
organization that the United States classifies as a terrorist organization.72 
The development of conflict in Chechnya, particularly after the USSR 
dissolution, indicates the pitfalls of the coercive approach to ending non-
international armed conflict. Chechen rebels caused more violence and 
spawned an active terrorist organization that continues to threaten 
Russia’s national security. 73  If Russia initially considered allowing 
Chechnya its independence and initially worked with the Chechen 
government towards a peaceful solution, the subsequent conflict 																																								 																					
67 Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, supra note 62. 
68 See Chechnya profile, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18190473 (last 
updated Dec. 9, 2014). 
69  See John Russell, Terrorists, bandits, spooks and thieves: Russia demonization of the 
Chechens before and since 9/11, 26 THIRD WORLD Q. 101, 106 (2005). 
70 See id. Publicly, the Republic was dismantled, but there is still suspicion that it has moved 
underground.  
71 See id. 
72 Media Note, Designation of Caucasus Emirate, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State 
(May 26, 2011) available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164312.htm. 
73 Id. For example the US Department of State has stated the following instances of terrorism 
incurred by Caucasus Emirate “use[ ] bombings, shootings and attempted assassinations to provoke a 
revolution and expel the Russian government from the North Caucasus region. David M. 
Herzenhorn, Americans Traveling to Winter Games Cautioned, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/sports/olympics/americans-traveling-to-winter-games-
cautioned.html?_r=0. Just recently, “The [U.S. State D]epartment also noted that Doku Umarov, the 
leader of the Caucasus Emirate, a Muslim separatist group designated by the United States as a 
terrorist organization, threatened in July to attack the [2014 Sochi] Olympics.”  
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witnessed in the first and second Russo-Chechen wars could have been 
decreased dramatically or avoided entirely. 
Each of these examples, Al Qaeda, the IRA, and Chechnya rebels, 
shows that the coercive approach in a non-international armed conflict is 
not effective. Coercive tactics proved unsuccessful; therefore, the 
ideology that carrying a “big stick” solves foreign affairs works is 
disproven. Furthermore, using a diplomatic façade while using 
underlying coercive tactics only creates further cynicism and disbelief in 
peaceful resolutions during armed conflict. If there is a desire for peace 
with non-state actors, it is essential for states to take a different approach 
towards threats, on-going disputes, and non-state actors’ future attacks. 
 
III. ENDING NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT:  
WHAT DOES WORK 
 
Conflict resolution between groups of people is difficult, specifically 
when different people within groups want different results. However, 
there are solutions that will work to end current and future-armed 
conflicts. This Comment proposes two successful conflict resolution 
tactics with successful history in ending past non-international armed 
conflicts. The first tactic is to address grievances to diffuse tensions with 
non-state actors. The second tactic is to promote international 
cooperation and to focus international community efforts to work 
towards peaceful solutions and international treaties that bind states to 
work together to stop non-state actors involved in armed conflict.  
 
A. Addressing Grievances 
 
There are two types of non-state actor grievances. First, there are 
grievances that can be addressed and the wrongs made right. Second, 
there are irrational grievances that have reached a point of such extremity 
that it would be impossible to right those wrongs. Addressing grievances 
of non-state actors does work when the grievances fall in the first 
category. However, it is important to recognize that there are situations 
when it is not feasible to end non-international armed conflicts.  
There are two criteria for reaching a peaceful conclusion to non-
international armed conflict through addressing grievances. First, in 
order to use this approach, the non-state actor’s mission, purpose, and 
goals must be rational and legitimate. This would mean that the non-state 
actor has a clear objective that would be possible to solve through 
negotiation. Second, there must also be a hierarchal system within the 
non-state actor’s organization where negotiations with leaders are 
possible. If both criteria are met, then addressing the grievance is 
plausible as a peaceful means to end non-international conflict, i.e. the 
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agreement that was made in the Northern Ireland conflict, and possibly 
the Russo-Chechen conflict.  
This Section discusses both types of grievances and the different 
approaches to resolving those grievances. Additional discussion of 
irrational grievances is found in Parts III (B), discussing international 
cooperation, and Part IV, examining other strategies of peace. 
 
1. Wrongs That Can Be Made Right 
 
The method used for working in complex business and governmental 
relationships can also work when addressing the grievances of non-state 
actors. The root causes of many non-state actors’ grievances are 
“poverty, social inequality and exclusion, dispossession and political 
grievance, oppression and human rights abuse, population explosion, and 
demographical factors.”74 Once the root cause and the non-state actor’s 
platform are understood, the involved state can take action to address the 
situation.  
Coming to a mutual agreement in conflicting situations can be 
difficult, but being able to address the issue and work towards a middle 
ground is possible. Stephen Covey postulates that middle ground can be 
reached in a “Win/Win frame of mind and heart that constantly seeks 
mutual benefit in all human interactions. Win/Win means that 
agreements or solutions are mutually beneficial [and] mutually satisfying 
. . . [and therefore, parties] see life as a cooperative, not a competitive 
arena.”75 A Win/Win approach does not mean that a state should give 
into every grievance a non-state actor has, but the mindset is to work 
towards a solution where “all parties feel good about the decision and are 
committed to the action plan.”76 Superficial or one-sided agreements that 
meet the needs of either party or only one party set the agreement up for 
failure. In contrast, addressing the grievances of non-state actors through 
a Win/Win solution where both the state and the non-state actor are 
committed to succeeding together will often end an armed conflict or 
prevent it in the first place.  
In the conflict with Chechnya, Russia did not take the Win/Win 
solution route. The Russians wanted to militarily dominate and control 
Chechnya to maintain access to natural resources, rather than create a 
cooperative framework to work towards a peaceful resolution. Part of the 
Win/Win mindset initially requires both sides to seek mutual benefit. 
Neither side may get everything it aspires to, but seeking a mutual 
benefit means both sides are willing to negotiate to reach a consensus 
through negotiation. 																																								 																					
74 Edward Newman, Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism, 29 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM, 751 (2006). 
75  STEPHEN COVEY, 7 HABITS FOR HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE: POWERFUL LESSONS IN 
PERSONAL CHANGE 207 (2005). 
76 Id. 
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By comparison, an example of where the Win/Win solution worked 
is the Northern Ireland conflict. After decades of destruction, anger, and 
hostilities between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, both sides 
nurtured a desire for peace talks. At the end of 1997 and beginning of 
1998, the idea of peace was still a very remote idea, but there was some 
hope: “multi-party talks had been established in June 1996; Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) paramilitaries had restored their ceasefire in 
July 1997; and, by September of that year, the political representatives of 
the republican and loyalist paramilitaries were engaged in the talks at 
Stormont in Belfast.”77 Obviously, both sides held doubts that they could 
come to an agreement, but finally on Good Friday, April 10, 1998 
negotiations produced an agreement that was acceptable to both parties.78  
Disagreements in the beginning of negotiation talks, specifically the 
“Ulster Unionist team’s [unhappiness] with some of the detail, 
particularly the sections dealing with the decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons and the release of paramilitary prisoners [required 
extra attention]. A personal assurance from Tony Blair to UUP leader 
David Trimble smoothed these last ripples of discontent.”79 Both sides 
compromised and replaced the Anglo-Irish Agreement with a new 
British-Irish Agreement, which included the right of the Irish people to 
ultimately decide if they wanted to be a part of a united Ireland or Great 
Britain. 80  Additionally the agreement, overall, included peaceful 
arrangements to address future disagreements between Northern Ireland 
and the United Kingdom by establishing the “Northern Ireland assembly 
with a power-sharing executive, new cross-border institutions involving 
the Irish Republic[,] and a body linking devolved assemblies across the 
United Kingdom with Westminster and Dublin.”81  
The agreement established a democratically elected, power-sharing 
assembly in Northern Ireland. 82 The agreement also established 
Ministerial Council between Northern Ireland and Ireland to work 
through issues that involved both Northern and Southern Ireland.83 The 
most significant achievement was the establishment of the British-Irish 
Council comprised of representatives from “the British and Irish 
Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales, when established, and, if appropriate, elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Man and the 
																																								 																					
77 Good Friday Agreement, BBC HISTORY, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/good_friday_agreement (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
78 Id. (“At 5.30pm on Friday 10 April 1998, George Mitchell stated: ‘I am pleased to announce 
that the two governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland have reached agreement.’”). 
79 Id. 
80 The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, 3, N. Ir.-U.K., Apr. 10, 1998, [hereinafter Peace 
Agreement] available at http://peacemaker.un.org/uk-ireland-good-friday98. 
81 The Good Friday Agreement in full, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2004, 1:47 PM), [hereinafter Good 
Friday Agreement] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4079267.stm. 
82 Id. 
83 See id. 
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Channel Islands.”84 Both sides reconciled their setbacks and met on 
middle ground to find a solution where both parties agreed to the action 
plan.  
This compromise was a long process and required both sides to shift 
their paradigm of seeing the relationship as a competitive arena to a 
cooperative arena. Without that paradigm shift, this agreement would not 
have been possible. After the treaty was signed, Northern Ireland voted 
and approved the agreement and has remained united with the United 
Kingdom.85 This majority agreement further solidified the commitment 
by both parties to agree to peace. Ultimately, both parties “committed to 
the action plan.”86 In fact the agreement states: 
 
We are committed to partnership, equality and mutual 
respect as the basis of relationships within Northern 
Ireland, between North and South, and between these 
islands. . . . We reaffirm our total and absolute 
commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful 
means of resolving differences on political issues, and 
our opposition to any use or threat of force by others for 
any political purpose, whether in regard to this 
agreement or otherwise. . . . We acknowledge the 
substantial differences between our continuing, and 
equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we 
will endeavour to strive in every practical way towards 
reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework 
of democratic and agreed arrangements. We pledge that 
we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of 
each and every one of the arrangements to be established 
under this agreement.87 
 
This statement recognized “substantial differences”88 on each side, 
but the tone was clearly the desire for a successful outcome. Each side 
gave a little to reach this point. The outcome did not fully reflect what 
each side wanted, but it met the Win/Win solution concept where both 
sides were willing to give and take in order to reach a cooperative 
outcome. 
The agreement further fits the Win/Win concept by committing to 
the plan of action, particularly the following commitment: 																																								 																					
84  Id. The full agreement also available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/07_12_04_ni_agreement_02.pdf.  
85 The agreement “recognise[d] the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a 
majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue 
to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.” Peace Agreement, supra note 
80, at 3. 
86 COVEY, supra note 75, at 207. 
87 Peace Agreement, supra note 80, at 2. 
88 Id. 
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The tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly 
regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget 
those who have died or been injured, and their families. 
But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in 
which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement 
of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the 
protection and vindication of the human rights of all.89 
 
The Northern Ireland agreement is not perfect, and there are 
remaining IRA affiliates who still carry out small attacks since the 
signing, but this agreement placed the decision in the hands of those 
living in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland’s citizens also have the 
option to choose citizenship in either Ireland or the United Kingdom.90 
The agreement returned autonomy to Northern Ireland and addressed its 
grievances. Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom shared a bloody 
and violent journey, but through the willingness of both sides to 
negotiate, and the United Kingdom’s willingness to address the 
grievances of Northern Ireland, both parties were able to agree on a 
peaceful outcome that continues to enjoy relative success. 
 
2. Irrational Grievances: Modern International Terrorism 
 
In contrast to grievances that can be addressed, there are situations of 
armed conflict where the opposition’s grievance is too irrational for a 
state(s) to engage with it in negotiation. For example, the international 
terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, and its extreme positions continue to 
make it nearly impossible for the United States or any other state to 
respond to its demands or grievances.  
Al-Qaeda is different from past terrorist organizations; it is part of a 
new age of “‘modern’ terrorist groups” who “are not hierarchical [and] 
do not have clear territorial objectives.”91 Modern terrorist organizations 
“may conceive of themselves as tied to a civilian group, but that 
connection is arguably much more tenuous than that of the Irish 
Republican Army to Northern Irish Catholics.”92 Furthermore, Al-Qaeda 
“lack[s] clear objectives to negotiate, does not have a command structure 
to negotiate with, and has no incentive to act reasonably because it is not 
advancing the interests of any civilian population.”93 In fact, Al-Qaeda’s 
core mission is this:  																																								 																					
89 Id. 
90  See Irish citizenship through birth or descent, Citizens Information, 
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/moving_country/irish_citizenship/irish_citizenship_through_bi
rth_or_descent.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
91 Erin Creegan, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Treatment of Terrorist Combatants (Protocol IV)-A Proposal, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
345, 369 (2011). 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
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The overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an 
Islamic regime. Additional goals include the following:  
 
1. Gathering information about the enemy, the 
land, the installations, and the neighbors. 
2. Kidnaping enemy personnel, documents, secrets, 
and arms.  
3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as 
foreign tourists.  
4. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the 
enemy.  
5. Spreading rumors and writing statements that 
instigate people against the enemy. 
6. Blasting and destroying the places of 
amusement, immorality, and sin; not a vital target. 
7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and 
attacking vital economic centers. 
8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and 
out of the cities.94 
 
Al-Qaeda desires to replace Western governments with Islamic 
regimes and acts to do so coercively, even violently. This is neither 
obtainable nor reasonable. Its demands to coercively end Westernized 
beliefs, Christianity, and/or other religions would be impossible for most 
states to concede. Creating a Win/Win solution with an organization like 
Al-Qaeda would be very difficult because its demands are too 
irrational.95  
These types of grievances would leave the United States (and other 
states) unable to commit to any type of action plan. Additionally, this 
would be a war of beliefs and ideas with neither of the two sides being 
able to come to a peaceful agreement. This stands in contrast to the 
IRA’s more rational grievances that could be addressed and amends that 
could be made. Further, at this point, negotiation is impossible with Al-
Qaeda because 1) there is no clear hierarchal structure; and 2) there are 
no talking points for grievances that could be addressed. Ultimately to 
address the grievances, the state involved in the armed conflict has the 
responsibility to recognize the need and possess a desire for there to be 
peaceful negotiations. The non-state actor has the responsibility to have 
rational objectives that can be accomplished.  
  
																																								 																					
94  DECLARATION OF JIHAD, THE AL QAEDA MANUAL, (English Trans.) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/manualpart1_1.pdf. This manual was found in an Al Qaeda member’s 
home after a police raid. 
95 Creegan, supra note 91, at 369–70. (“Even if there are political objectives, such as the 
creation of a world Islamic state, the objectives are wildly unrealistic at best, and do not conceive of 
real, immediate political change.”). 
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B. International Cooperation 
 
Historically, states have been reluctant to give any legitimized legal 
status to rebels or to recognize rebel movements.96 When rebels “[took] 
up arms against states, states preferred to deal with them under their 
national law, trying them as common criminals. In this case against Al-
Qaeda, the resort to force itself would be illegal, and the rebels would be 
tried for war crimes even without any other violation of international 
humanitarian law.” 97  Furthermore international law precluded other 
states from interfering with internal conflicts for fear of imposing on the 
sovereignty and autonomy of a state.98 But with no restrictions for states, 
like the case here, problems arose with inhumane treatment of the 
opposition within international armed conflict and there was a demand 
for “some sort of an international response.”99  
An international response for non-international armed conflicts 
would include creating laws, treaties, and limits for states to agree to and 
follow when dealing with non-state actors. Additionally, these 
international treaties would require states to share information with other 
states when dealing with violent, international non-state actors. 
Information sharing is important for international cooperation because it 
can aid in getting to the heart of the conflict and reaching peaceful 
solutions. An ideal world would be a place where each state is working 
in unison with other states towards peaceful solutions in situations of 
non-international armed conflict; however, this is currently not the case 
and so adjustments have to be made. 
One of the ways that states could achieve international cooperation 
and end terrorist activities of non-state actors is through containment. 
“The cold war strategy of containment would be a . . . better way to react 
to the problem of politicized violence committed by non-state actors.”100 
This would require states to “isolate access points to and from potential 
terrorist bases such as airports, ports, roads[,] and trails at borders. Such 
access points should be policed by in-state police forces, not militarized 
by other countries’ militaries.”101 Thus, instead of a state sending military 
factions to militarize these areas outside of its borders, a state would 
police its own borders. In the case of piracy in Southeast Asia, this same 
approach could be successful. This means that “[in h]elping states 
develop their own surveillance and enforcement capacities, long term, 
																																								 																					
96  RESPECTING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 65 (Michael Veuthey & Gian Luca Beruto eds. 
2013). 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 Id. (emphasis added). 
100 ENGLE, supra note 1, at 151. 
101 Id. 
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and longer lasting, solutions will be possible.”102 This might not work in 
every situation because it requires states to take responsibility and not all 
states desire or have the resources to be part of an international 
cooperative to stop violent, non-state actors.  
Encouragement and support of peaceful negotiations of other states 
dealing with non-international armed conflicts is another way to foster 
international cooperation. Even in the case of states that do not want to 
cooperate, if that state has a high-value relationship with another state 
that encourages proactive actions then the disinterested state is more 
likely to be cooperative.  
For instance, during negotiations of the Good Friday Agreement with 
Northern Ireland, the United States strongly supported peaceful 
negotiations. Additionally, “[t]he Clinton Administration was 
instrumental in helping the parties forge the agreement, and the Bush 
Administration strongly backed its full implementation. U.S. officials 
welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the 
restoration of the devolved government in 2007.”103 Support from other 
states can encourage states and non-state actors to seek Win/Win 
solutions where each side would be committed to solving conflicts 
through peaceful negotiations. The United States has continued its 
encouragement of the Northern Ireland Agreement, most recently by the 
Obama Administration.104 For instance, “[i]n October 2009, then U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the 
Assembly, and urged Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement 
on the devolution of policing and justice.”105  
After WWII, the reasoning behind the UN Charter was to create an 
international cooperation to prevent future international conflicts, 
specifically international armed conflicts. This idea can be equally 
applied to non-international armed conflicts. International cooperation at 
this level would be a beneficial resource by encouraging and supporting 
peaceful reconciliations between states, as well as advising and helping 
states to create lasting solutions for future situations like enforcement 
and policing within their states. 
 
IV. A STRATEGY FOR LONG-LASTING PEACE 
 
The dynamics of war having changed the world makes the proactive 
prevention of future non-international armed conflicts necessary. The 
very dynamics of war have advanced technologically, and new swifter, 
deadlier armed attacks are occurring. There are three proactive methods, 
though not completely ideal for international cooperation and long-																																								 																					
102 Adam J. Young & Mark J. Valencia, Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility, 25 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA, 269, 281 (2003).  
103 Archick, supra note 47, at 15. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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lasting peaceful solutions that would be successful in preventing future 
non-international armed conflicts. The three approaches are: 1) 
alleviating poverty; 2) educating youth and creating community 
involvement projects for civilians; and perhaps the most challenging, 3) 
changing the mindset of how the United States and other states view 
foreign affairs and relationships with other states.  
 
A. Alleviating Poverty Alleviates Armed Conflict 
 
In many states poverty alleviation does not seem to be a possibility 
because the state has failed. A “failed state[106] is a state that does not 
achieve an effective domestic governance structure.” 107  Poverty and 
crime go hand in hand: poverty increases as crime increases and vice 
versa. Crime rises when criminals believe that the benefits of committing 
the crime outweigh the negative consequences.108 The creation of many 
violent non-state actors is the result of impoverished failed states: 
 
“Poverty of resources, combined with poverty of 
prospects, choices and respect, help enable terrorism to 
thrive.” Poverty can breed resentment and desperation 
and support for political extremism. In addition, as well 
as providing grounds for grievance, poverty often means 
underdevelopment, poor or weak governance, or failed 
states, something that has been referred to as “back 
holes” within which fanaticism can emerge. Poor 
societies often make for weak states, which may not 
have the capacity to prevent terrorist activity or 
recruitment.109 
 
For example, this has been the case “in such environments—such as 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan, Somalia, Georgia, Yemen, and Algeria—
that local or transnational terrorist organizations can find a base of 
operations, a vacuum of authority, and a source of support.” 110 
Specifically in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was headed by Osama bin Laden 
at the time of its most successful international attack, September 11. In 
fact, Al-Qaeda top operatives were relatively wealthy individuals, like 
Osama bin Laden, or at least from the middle-class. The complexity of 
planning international crimes requires “management and technological 
skills found in the upper and middle classes[, while] also need[ing] foot-																																								 																					
106 ENGLE, supra note 1, at 139. 
107 Id. at 129. (“There are many examples of failed states: Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, 
Cambodia, Chechnya and East Timor are all examples of states that failed or are failing.”). 
108 See Haiyun Zhao, Zhilan Feng, & Carlos Castillo-Chávez, Mathematical and Theoretical 
Biology Inst., Ariz. State Univ., The Dynamics of Poverty and Crime, MTBI-02-08M, 225 (2005) 
available at https://mtbi.asu.edu/sites/default/files/Dynamics_Poverty_Crime.pdf. 
109 Newman, supra note 74, at 751 (citations omitted). 
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soldiers who overwhelmingly hale from the poor and down-trodden.”111 
Impoverished states with high populations of the downtrodden are ripe 
for violent groups to arise. To proactively end violent non-state actors’ 
aggression, thriving poverty and its consequent effects must be reduced, 
thus reducing the large number of potential foot soldiers. 
The popular idea of sending food and aid to eliminate poverty in 
impoverished states is not creating self-sufficient states and is not a 
viable, long-lasting approach to end poverty. Sending food and aid only 
encourages impoverished states to depend on the provider states and this 
can create a vicious cycle of long-term dependence.112 A more viable 
approach is to share the necessary support and resources for 
impoverished countries to gain control over their economy and citizens. 
Providing support and resources for countries to gain control over their 
economy and citizens will reduce “the space and oxygen for terrorist 
groups to flourish.”113 How is it that states like the United States, a 
comparably young state in the Western World, is one of the top world 
powers? Self-reliance.  
For a failed state to attain self-sufficiency the international 
community must encourage it to reduce or eliminate corruption and to 
use its reliable resources that are sustainable. 114  This places a 
responsibility on First World states to reduce the dependency of failed 
states on First World aid and resources and to begin to work towards 
sustainable economies in these failed states.115 A failed state can then 
become self-reliant, as well as self-governing, and can enforce its laws 
among its criminals resulting in a lower likelihood of terrorist 
organizations or violent non-state actors.  
 
B. Educating Youth and Increasing Community Involvement 
 
Educating the youth in these failed states is a way to proactively 
prevent youth, the future generations, from joining these violent non-
state actor groups and becoming radicalized. At present, failed states 
“lack the capacity for the types of education program[s] that might 
reduce support for terrorism.”116  Today’s youth will lead the future 
generations. If the hope is for peace, then investing in today’s youth will 
ultimately empower future leadership of these states.  
Pope John Paul II expresses the importance of holding people to the 
standard they deserve and relates this standard to peace by saying: 
“[A]uthentic peace is only possible if the dignity of the human person is 
promoted at every level of society, and every individual is given the 																																								 																					
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chance to live in accordance with this dignity.” 117  For there to be 
authentic peace that is long-lasting there must be a revamp in these 
impoverished, failed states to provide education for every individual and 
begin setting up communities where people are held to a higher standard 
more in accordance with their dignity. This concept is difficult to 
envision and can be attributed to the lack of free thought and liberal 
education in some of these states; but if there can be a push towards 
education, in general, then this can positively lead to new directions. 
Especially in poorer areas of failed states, to improve education in these 
areas will improve the standard of living, which will in turn reduce 
crime. In fact, “[m]ost criminals begin their participation in illegal 
activities as juvenile or young adult offenders.”118 If the youth in failed 
states, where terrorism and violent non-state actors thrive, are given the 
ability to become educated in a non-biased educational system and 
encouraged to become involved in service to their communities at a 
young age, this might change the pattern of corruption and dishonesty in 
many failed states. Furthermore, changes in education will be crucial to 
alleviating poverty, as these states will need educated individuals to 
create future stable governments. 
Also, educating youth encourages community involvement by adults 
and youth to serve each other and create coalitions of programs to better 
the community. Community involvement brings accountability to one 
another and a support system for success. Increased community outreach 
will empower citizens to reach new levels of self-reliance and 
independence from crime. Furthermore, education and community 
involvement are proactive ways to prevent non-state actors’ recruiting 
techniques and give individuals an opportunity to resolve their own 
grievances by changing their communities and leadership in those 
communities. Education is one of the paths to freedom that can breed 
self-reliance in poorer communities.  
 
C. Changing the Mindset of Objectivity and War 
 
As mentioned above, President Roosevelt’s philosophy of carrying a 
“big stick” to force peace negotiations is a failed mindset. This has been 
a paradigm for many larger states with strong interests in smaller states. 
The larger state uses its power to coercively obtain the smaller state’s 
resources, while representing its actions as “peaceful” negotiations. The 
mindset of the United States and other nations must change if there is to 
be peace. Nation states and non-state actors must discard old paradigms 																																								 																					
117 Pope John Paul II, Message of Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the World Day of 
Peace: Women: Teachers of Peace ¶ 1 (Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Message of Pope John Paul II], 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-
ii_mes_08121994_xxviii-world-day-for-peace_en.html. 
118 Sebastian Galiani, Martín Rossi, & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Conscription and Crime, at 2, 
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of objectifying others and replace them with a new perspective as 
viewing others as people.  
Previously some states have viewed citizens, non-state actors, etc., as 
objects to be used to reach a desired underlying purpose. For non-state 
actors, this occurs when goals are an array of wants like political gain, 
territorial gain, or even a demand for human rights protections and the 
objectivity is to surpass the nation state. When others are seen as objects, 
our hearts are at war, hatred is rampant, and others are just obstacles to 
hurdle or vehicles to help us navigate to what we want; other parties 
become irrelevant and therefore detachment of their needs occurs.119 
Seeing others as people will prevent the incitation of hatred, which 
“invariably escalates violence, engendering circularity and reciprocal 
self-justification.”120 But when others are seen as people, our hearts are at 
peace and the hopes, needs, cares, and fears of other parties are as real as 
our own.121 To successfully negotiate peacefully with the opposition, 
parties must understand the other’s “concerns and worries” just as much 
as their own.122 From this point forward, the way to successfully and 
proactively resolve conflict in an authentically peaceful way is to change 
mindsets. 
Referred to above, Russia’s conflict with Chechnya is a specific 
example where a conflict worsened because one state viewed the other as 
an object and an obstacle to overcome in order to retain its interests in 
Chechnya’s natural resources. Russia was not concerned with the hopes, 
needs, or cares of the Chechens; rather, it viewed them as a hurdle to 
retain the natural resources123 within Chechnya. This view of Chechnya 
as an object furthered war, violence, and conflict. If there is to be success 
in avoiding non-international armed conflicts like that in Chechnya then 
there has to be a change in the collective society as well as the individual 
actor mindset. “Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and 
productive, must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that 
every human being is a person, that is, his nature is endowed with 
intelligence and free will.”124 
Individuals, nation states, and society will not change because 
someone says it is important to do so. In fact it is impossible to change 
others. Change must come from within, and the only way to successfully 
change others is to change our own mindset. To do so, we must redirect 
our outlook, and instead of dealing with things that are going wrong, we 
must start helping things go right.125  
The first step in helping things go right is to discard the approach of 
viewing others as an obstacle to gaining self-interests. To successfully 																																								 																					
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view others as individuals and not objects, it is very important to build 
the relationship with the opposing side. It is difficult to see someone as 
an object if we have taken the time to develop a relationship with her and 
become aware of her grievances and issues.126  
The second step is to communicate with and educate the opposing 
party. “If a country doesn’t clearly and persuasively communicate the 
reasons for the actions it is taking in the world community, it invites 
resistance to those efforts, whatever the context.”127 A specific example 
is the lack of transparency and lack of communication regarding the 
United States’ actions toward Guantanamo and its detainees and its 
resistance to Guantanamo’s objectives even in the face of other successes 
in the war on terror. Even in peaceful situations, communication and 
transparency is important. This translates into listening and learning 
about those with whom the state is trying to communicate. In fact, “[a] 
country’s . . . leaders [should be] actively trying to learn about and from 
the people they are trying to communicate with.”128  
Third and finally, peaceful relationships occur when a state builds 
relationships with others who have influence over the opposition in the 
particular situation where there is conflict. This is similar to the United 
States’ approach with North Korea by building a relationship with China 
who clearly has influence over North Korea. Up to this point, through its 
relationship with China, the United States has been able to prevent 
attacks by North Korea.129 Having positive, authentic relationships with 
those of opposing viewpoints is beneficial because such relationships 
allow for more sincerity between both sides and a better ability to solve 
non-state actor conflicts when they do arise.  
Preventing non-international armed conflicts is a complex problem, 
but the three approaches mentioned above: alleviating poverty; educating 
youth and encouraging community involvement in failed states; and 
changing the mindset of individuals, state actors, and non-state actors is 
the strategy for lasting peace that will proactively prevent future non-
international armed conflicts. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The best solution for non-international armed conflict peace is for 
states to change their current conflict control approach to a more 
proactive and futuristic approach. States who are currently at peace 
should work to 1) maintain their stability, 2) educate their youth and 
younger generations to run stable, peaceful governments, and 3) 																																								 																					
126 See generally, id. at 208–10. 
127 Id. at 205. 
128 Id. at 207. 
129 See generally Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf, Modern Threats and the United Nations 
Security Council: No Time for Complacency (A Response to Professor Allen Weiner), 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1395 n.219 (2010) (demonstrating China’s influence over North Korea). 
SUMMER 2015 THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
236 
 
proactively prevent armed conflict through the three approaches 
mentioned in Part IV. 
Also, those at peace can become involved in international 
cooperation to encourage peaceful negotiations within other states that 
are currently involved in non-international armed conflicts. However, the 
states currently involved in a non-international armed conflict can begin 
by addressing the grievances of those they are at war with and seek 
international cooperation to help end the conflict.  
These approaches130 are an appropriate method meant to protect 
civilians and states from future bloodshed and conflict. This Comment 
advocates for “sustainable peace in which the majority of people on this 
planet have access to enough resources to live dignified lives, where 
these people have enough access to education and health care, so that 
they can live in freedom from want and freedom from fear.”131 While 
there will always be conflicts between individuals and their governments, 
these methods are a way to prevent such conflicts from escalating to 
armed conflict, like the escalations of conflict in Northern Ireland, 
Chechnya, Al-Quaeda, or any other existing or future global conflict. 
 
 
																																								 																					
130  Addressing grievances, international cooperation, alleviating poverty, educating youth, 
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